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Introduction
   A strategic alliance is defined as a business relationship among autonomous firms that might 
otherwise stand in rivalry. Moreover, a strategic alliance is characterized by the fact that high 
performance can be achieved through long-term collaboration (Ushimaru 2002). Since 
organizational learning takes place quickly, strategic alliances are regarded as superior to 
mergers and acquisitions (M&A) in a context of great environmental uncertainty (Ushimaru 
2000). 
   However, the strategic alliance is distinguished by its instability and by its high probability of 
dissolution in the short term (Ushimaru 2001). More specifically, it is difficult to form a 
relationship between two firms that offers advantages to both sides; moreover, if one side betrays 
the other, then only one side will derive an advantage. However, M&A involve an integration of 
the complex systems of both partners and are very costly, so a relationship created in this way, 
following M&A, is almost never dissolved. In contrast, strategic alliances require less integration 
than do M&A, and are very easily dissolved as a result. 
   The fact that a strategic alliance is unstable brings with it the critical question of how a firm 
should be managed, following the establishment of an alliance, so that the relationship may be 
maintained. 
   This study has two goals. The first is the development of a new analytic framework. This 
framework is based on game theory and characterizes the maintenance of strategic alliances. The 
second goal is the simulation of the analytic model. This simulation is based on system dynamics 
and characterizes how the constituent elements of strategic alliances behave. The effectiveness of
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this approach as an analytic tool is also examined.
Analytic Framework
Structural Cooperation and Motivational Cooperation 
   One source of instability in a strategic alliance arises because a partner relationship 
necessarily involves a situation analogous to the "prisoner's dilemma". In the "prisoner's 
dilemma" involving a cooperative relationship, betrayal or deviation yields a greater payoff than 
does cooperation for each firm; therefore, both firms choose betrayal and, as a result, the payoff 
for each is low. Two conceivable ways of maintaining a strategic alliance exist, namely, the 
"structural cooperation approach" and the "motivational cooperation approach" (Zeng and Chen 
2003). 
   The "structural cooperation approach" attempts to resolve the dilemma by changing the 
payoff structure of the game. Put simply, "changing the payoff structure" means applying some 
penalty to a player who chooses to deviate. Adding a penalty provides an incentive to choose 
cooperation. In this sense, such methods attempt o maintain a cooperative relationship through 
the adoption of a penalty system. For this reason, we call methods that change the payoff 
structure "structural cooperation." Thus, structural cooperation becomes effective when partners 
behave opportunistically. 
   The "motivational cooperation approach" attempts to resolve the dilemma intrinsically, or 
voluntarily, without using any structural means. Motivational cooperation becomes effective when 
the game is repeated infinitely, as well as when the expected payoff is sufficiently high. First, in a 
finitely repeated game, betrayal is optimal for each player, even if the game is played a thousand 
times. Even if a cooperative relationship continues until the 999-th trial, betrayal is preferred by 
each player in the final trial, because there is no need to consider the future. Since it is known 
that deviation will occur in the final trial, the best strategy is deviation from the beginning to the 
end, whenever the number of trials is finite. Therefore, in the finitely repeated case, both players 
choose to deviate, and no cooperative relationship arises. However, in the infinitely repeated case, 
it is beneficial for both sides to select a cooperative strategy if certain conditions are fulfilled. This 
fact is generally known as the "Folk Theorem". The Folk Theorem also makes clear that, if the 
expected future payoff is sufficiently high, it is more advantageous to select a cooperative strategy 
than to deviate via betrayal.
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   Note, however, that structural cooperation carries with it the additional problem of a 
secondary dilemma (Yamamoto 1997). That is, even if penalties for betrayal are adopted as an 
institution, there is no guarantee that all parties to the alliance will comply with it. Rather, it 
becomes necessary to monitor compliance and to put the penalty system into effect in the case of 
noncompliance. These activities naturally require some expense. Moreover, if the expense 
resulting from the implementation of the penalty system exceeds the amount of the additional 
gain generated by cooperation, it becomes meaningless to create such a system and impose 
regulations such as monitoring and penalty enforcement. In practice, it is not possible to monitor 
a business partner accurately. Therefore, it is difficult to maintain a cooperative relationship 
through structural cooperation. For example, Ushimaru (2003) examined empirically which 
approach (structural cooperation or motivational cooperation) was more effective in the 
maintenance of a strategic alliance, and found that motivational cooperation is typically more 
effective. 
   A trade-off between structural cooperation and motivational cooperation is commonly 
supposed to exist. According to intrinsic motivation theory, if a player is continually given some 
reward from the outside for actions he performs voluntarily, the intrinsic/voluntary motivation for 
that behavior will weaken and, in the end, the player will be motivated only by the external 
reward (Deci 1975). According to this theory, motivational cooperation should cease when it 
reaches the point where the strategic alliance is managed through structural cooperation. That is, 
as penalties have an increasingly strong impact in maintaining the strategic alliance, the impact of 
the expected future payoff on relationship maintenance weakens. However, intrinsic motivation 
theory assumes that a one-way relationship exists (i.e., there is a single giver of a reward and a 
single receiver of the reward), and that the receiver is passive. The actual cooperative relationship 
is bidirectional and active, however, with both partners building the reward/penalty structure. 
Therefore, it can be easily imagined that motivational cooperation may weaken structural 
cooperation. In this regard, Ushimaru (2003) conducted an empirical study into which approach 
proved more effective in maintaining a strategic alliance, and reported the existence of a trade-off 
relationship between structural cooperation and motivational cooperation.
Environmental Uncertainty 
   Environmental uncertainty is not considered in the above discussion about the maintenance 
of a strategic alliance. The above discussion assumes that the strategy taken by each player is
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accurately communicated, and that it is also possible for each player to foretell his future 
expected payoff accurately. However, in reality, the environment is uncertain. Thus, it is unclear 
to each player what strategy the other player will adopt, and it is also difficult for each player to 
predict his expected future payoff accurately. Therefore, even though motivational cooperation is 
effective in a certain environment, structural cooperation may be more effective for the 
management of a strategic alliance in an uncertain environment. 
   First, note that the effectiveness of motivational cooperation decreases as uncertainty 
increases. This decline occurs because uncertainty reduces expected payoffs, which drive 
motivational cooperation, and because infinitely repeated transactions become uncertain in this 
context. As a result, it is not clear what kind of performance can be obtained in the future through 
cooperation. Predictions of how long the cooperative relationship will continue are also rendered 
useless. Therefore, as environmental uncertainty increases, the effectiveness of motivational 
cooperation decreases. 
   Next, note further that, under structural cooperation, it is conceivable that, in an uncertain 
environment, methods of cooperative enforcement, such as severe penalties for deviation, might 
be employed in order to suppress opportunistic behavior on the part of a business partner. 
However, if uncertainty increases too much, then the monitoring cost increases and the
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secondary dilemma mentioned above arises. Therefore, it is thought that the effectiveness of 
structural cooperation tends to increase as uncertainty increases, but decreases after a certain 
point (Fig. 1). 
Trust 
   Numerous studies have acknowledged that trust formation is crucial for maintaining 
strategic alliances. For example, Child and Faulkner (1998) have pointed out that trust is crucial 
for the success of alliances (joint ventures). Also, research by Beamish (1988), Harrigan (1986), 
and others has clarified empirically that trust between joint-venture partners is crucial for the 
maintenance of long-term relationships. 
   "Trust" is defined as "the expectation that the other party will behave cooperatively towards 
one's self in a situation where there is potential for one's self to suffer losses if the other party 
behaves selfishly. (i.e., a situation where social uncertainty exists)" (Yamagishi 1998). Trust may 
be classified according to the following four types: deterrence-based trust, calculus-based trust, 
relational trust, and institution-based trust. 
   Deterrence-based trust occurs when a partner is trusted because he will incur a large loss in 
the case of betrayal. Calculus-based trust occurs when a partner is trusted because he expects to 
receive a large benefit in the future as a result of his cooperation. In the contexts of these two 
types of trust, it is difficult to calculate the changes in the gains or losses that occur as uncertainty 
increases; thus, these concepts differ from a concept of "trust" whereby the partners cooperate, 
even if they find themselves in an uncertain situation. On the other hand, relational trust is trust 
formed through bidirectional, ong-term, and recurrent interaction. The extent of the past trust or 
dependence relationship that has been built up between partners creates positive expectations in 
both partners of each other. As this sort of relational trust continues, an emotional relationship is 
formed in both directions, and this added bond results in citizenship behavior, such as mutual 
loyalty and wide-ranging support. Finally, institution-based trust is trust based on a legal system 
that protects rights and assets and forms the backdrop for the relationship; in particular, the 
extent to which the partner is trusted varies depending on whether or not the relationship occurs 
in a society where such a legal system is effective. Institution-based trust is regarded as the 
foundation for calculus-based trust and relational trust, as it must exist prior to their development. 
These two types of trust involve the trusting of a partner in the absence of uncertainty, and can be 
thought of as original concepts of trust. 
   The above considerations indicate that there are really only two distinct types of trust,
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namely institution-based trust, which exists prior to the formation of a relationship with a partner, 
and relational trust, which is formed after the fact. During the initial phase of relationship 
formation, institution-based trust plays a large role in the stability of strategic alliances under 
conditions of high uncertainty. It is thought that relational trust plays a larger role as a 
relationship becomes long term.
System Dynamics
   System dynamics is a technique for simulating the behavior of complex social systems and 
was originally an application of automatic control theory (adopted from engineering fields) to 
issues in the social sciences. Under system dynamics, the simulation of system behavior is 
carried out in order to elucidate a certain phenomenon in a complex social system; this task is 
accomplished by using a simplified system created by selecting the things thought to be key 
factors driving the phenomenon, and by clarifying the causal relationship of these factors. 
   One distinguishing feature of system dynamics is that it facilitates learning about dynamic 
systems that vary over time. Note that time discrepancies exist in the relationships among factors 
in real-world systems, as well as differences in the speed of effects. Another distinguishing feature 
is that system dynamics facilitates learning about complex systems that incorporate feedback. 
This feature is useful because the relationships among factors in real-world systems are typically 
not one way. 
   More technically, complex time-series systems are modeled using simultaneous difference 
equations or simultaneous ordinary differential equations, and problems are solved by supplying 
initial values for those equations. 
   The discussion "Limits to Growth" by the Club of Rome (Meadows et al. 1972) is an example 
of research based on system dynamics. However, at the time it was written, it was not possible to 
solve complex problems requiring numerical calculation without the aid of computers; therefore, 
the techniques used generally did not disseminate into the business world. However, during the 
1990s, which saw an increase in the sophistication and miniaturization of computer technology, as 
well as the development of STELLA, Powersim, and other software packages, these techniques 
became practical for researchers in the field of business studies and the social sciences. In the 
field of business studies, these methods were adopted as a problem-solving tool for formulating 
strategies, tactics, and management approaches. Attempts have even been made to use these
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techniques to balance scorecards. In the area of management research, these techniques have 
been treated by Senge (1990) as a business conceptualization method called "systems thinking." 
Therefore, in some sense, we can say that system dynamics is both an old and a new technique.
Simulation
Causal Relationship Model for the Stability of a Strategic Alliance 
   Figure 2 illustrates a causal relationship model of the factors that affect the stability of a 
strategic alliance. The model comprises three reinforcement loops (Rl, R2, R3), one balance loop 
(B1), and one exogenous variable (institution-based trust).
Loop Rl 
   This reinforcement loop comprises environmental uncertainty, expected payoffs, 
motivational cooperation, the stability of the strategic alliance, and relational trust. 
   If institution-based trust (the exogenous variable) is high, then environmental uncertainty 
decreases. As environmental uncertainty decreases, the expected payoffs increase. As the 
expected payoffs increase, motivational cooperation increases. When motivational cooperation 
increases, the stability of the strategic alliance increases. As the stability of the strategic alliance 
increases, relational trust increases. As relational trust increases, environmental uncertainty 
decreases. Moreover, the stability of the strategic alliance is reinforced through the repetition of 
this cycle. 
   In contrast, if institution-based trust is low, then environmental uncertainty increases. As 
environmental uncertainty rises, the expected payoffs decrease. As the expected payoffs 
decrease, motivational cooperation decreases. As motivational cooperation decreases, the stability 
of the strategic alliance increases. As the stability of the strategic alliance increases, relational 
trust decreases. As relational trust decreases, environmental uncertainty increases. In addition, 
the instability of the strategic alliance is reinforced through the repetition of this cycle.
Loop R2 
   This reinforcement loop comprises environmental uncertainty, the cost of monitoring, 
structural cooperation, the stability of the strategic alliance, and relational trust. 
   If institution-based trust (the exogenous variable) is high, then environmental uncertainty
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decreases. As environmental uncertainty decreases, the monitoring cost decreases. As the 
monitoring cost decreases, structural cooperation increases. As structural cooperation increases, 
the stability of the strategic alliance increases. As the stability of the strategic alliance increases, 
relational trust increases. As relational trust increases, environmental uncertainty decreases. The 
stability of the strategic alliance is reinforced through the repetition of this cycle. 
   If institution-based trust is low, then environmental uncertainty increases. As environmental 
uncertainty increases, the monitoring cost increases. As the monitoring cost increases, structural 
cooperation decreases. As structural cooperation decreases, the stability of the strategic alliance 
decreases. As the stability of the strategic alliance decreases, relational trust decreases. As 
relational trust decreases, environmental uncertainty increases. The instability of the strategic 
alliance is reinforced through the repetition of this cycle.
Loop Bl 
   This balance loop comprises environmental uncertainty, opportunistic behavior, structural 
cooperation, the stability of the strategic alliance, and relational trust. 
   If institution-based trust (the exogenous variable) is high, then environmental uncertainty 
decreases. As environmental uncertainty decreases, opportunistic behavior decreases. As 
opportunistic behavior decreases, structural cooperation decreases. As structural cooperation 
decreases, the stability of the strategic alliance decreases. As the stability of the strategic alliance 
decreases, relational trust decreases. As relational trust decreases, environmental uncertainty 
increases. As environmental uncertainty increases, opportunistic behavior increases. As 
opportunistic behavior increases, structural cooperation increases. As structural cooperation 
increases, the stability of the strategic alliance increases. As the stability of the strategic alliance 
increases, relational trust increases. As relational trust increases, environmental uncertainty 
decreases. In this case, therefore, the stability status of the strategic alliance becomes unstable, 
sometimes increasing and sometimes decreasing, through the repetition of this cycle. 
   If institution-based trust is low, the situation is the same as if it were high; that is, the 
strategic alliance repeatedly cycles through phases of increasing and decreasing stability.
Loop R3 
   This reinforcement loop comprises motivational cooperation and structural cooperation. 
There is a trade-off between these two types of cooperation, and thus, as motivational cooperation
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increases, structural cooperation decreases. Similarly, as structural cooperation decreases, 
motivational cooperation increases. This reinforcement cycle is repeated. 
   The stability of the strategic alliance results from the interaction of the above three loops. 
Furthermore, the relationships among the variables evolve with a time lag. For this reason, it is 
extremely difficult to predict stability. Computer simulations using system dynamics are an 
effective tool for predicting the outcomes of such time-oriented, complex behavior.
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Figure2. Causal Relationship Model Regarding the Stability of Strategic Alliance
Simulation Model and Operation 
   Figure 3 illustrates the simulation model using STELLA (software for simulating system 
dynamics). The adopted simulation model is qualitative, not quantitative. The numerical values 
chosen are all fictitious. Building a more complex model incorporating delay effects or 
complementary variables lowers the explanatory power of the model. Therefore, the model used 
for this analysis is simple. 
   The model comprises three features: stocks, flows, and connectors. A stock is a variable that 
accumulates value as time passes. A flow is a variable that causes a stock to increase or decrease 
as time passes. A connector indicates the causal direction between variables. There are eight 
stock variables in the model: the stability of the strategic alliance, motivational cooperation,
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structural cooperation, the expected payoffs, trust, environmental uncertainty, opportunistic 
behavior, and the monitoring cost. There are also eight flow variables in the model, which include 
the changes in motivational cooperation, structural cooperation, the expected payoffs, trust, 
environmental uncertainty, opportunistic behavior, and the monitoring cost. 
   One problem with the model, as formulated, is that all the numerical values used are 
fictitious; this fact makes it more likely that the measured results will be large. To resolve this 
potential problem, it is necessary to prevent the numerical stock values from inflating by 
restricting all of the numerical flow values to fall within a certain constant range. Therefore, the 
original data are first transformed using a probit. Then, 0.5 is subtracted from them; this value 
ensures that all of the original data remain within the range from - 0.5 to 0.5. Thus, if an original 
datum is equal to zero, the transformed datum is still equal to zero. However, the greater the 
original datum is relative to zero, the closer the transformed datum comes to 0.5. Similarly, the 
smaller the original datum is relative to zero, the closer the transformed datum comes to - 0.5.
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Results
   The aim of the study was, primarily, to examine the impact of environmental uncertainty and 
trust on the stability of a strategic alliance, on motivational cooperation, and on structural 
cooperation, and to observe how this impact changes over time. However, all of the data and 
coefficients are fictional; therefore, we established the following two patterns, the results of which 
are the easiest to predict: (1) a high degree of trust and low environmental uncertainty and (2) a 
low degree of trust and high environmental uncertainty. 
   The initial values of the variables other than uncertainty and trust are set to zero, which 
represents the state in which the respective variables are neither high nor low.
Pattern 1: High Trust, Low Uncertainty 
   We conduct this simulation by setting the initial value for trust at 10 and the initial value for 
environmental uncertainty at - 10. That the initial value for trust is 10 means, based on Formula 
1, that it is, in fact, close to 0.5; thus, institution-based trust is extremely high in this case. 
Subsequent variations in the trust value indicate variation in relational trust. In addition, that the 
initial value for uncertainty is - 10 indicates, based on Formula 1, that it is, in fact, close to 0.5; 
thus, uncertainty is extremely low in this case. 
   Figure 4 illustrates the simulation results. First, only motivational cooperation (line 3) 
increases, while structural cooperation (line 2) decreases. This motion reflects the fact that a 
trade-off exists between motivational cooperation and structural cooperation. The stability of the 
alliance increases because the increase in motivational cooperation is greater than the decrease in 
structural cooperation. This result is in accord with the general prediction that cooperation tends 
to arise more easily in situations where trust between partners is high and the environment is 
certain.
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Pattern 2: Low Trust, High Uncertainty 
   We conduct this simulation by setting the initial value for trust at - 10 and the initial value 
for environmental uncertainty at 10. That the initial value for trust is - 10 means, based on 
Formula 1, that it is, in fact, close to - 0.5; thus, institution-based trust is almost non-existent in 
this case. In addition, that the initial value for uncertainty is 10 indicates, based on Formula 1, that 
uncertainty is extremely high. 
   Figure 5 illustrates the simulation results. First, structural cooperation (line 2) increases until 
about time 40, at which point it decreases. Then, after a time of about 170 has elapsed, it becomes 
negative. That is, after time 170, structural cooperation causes instability of the strategic alliance, 
rather than stability. On the other hand, motivational cooperation (line 3) decreases until about 
time 40, at which point it increases. After time 170, it becomes positive. That is, after time 170, the 
stabilization of the strategic alliance is promoted. 
   However, the stability of the alliance always takes a negative value between time zero and 
time 210, and is itself extremely unstable. After time 210, it tends to increase with increases in 
motivational cooperation. In other words, if cooperation has not resolved by time 210, then the 
cooperative relationship thereafter becomes stable. This variation may occur in part because the 
maintenance of a long-term relationship leads to the formation of relational trust, a reduction in 
environmental uncertainty, and an increase in motivational cooperation.
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Conclusion
   In this paper, we have considered an analytic framework for the management of strategic 
alliances over the long term, and have conducted simulations using system dynamics. 
   First, in this regard, we considered the implications of game theory, which provides a 
theoretical framework by which to examine the stability of the strategic alliance. Then, based on 
this theoretical framework, we constructed an analytic model characterizing the stability of the 
strategic alliance. The key components of this model include motivational cooperation, structural 
cooperation, opportunistic behavior, a monitoring cost, expected payoffs, environmental 
uncertainty, and trust. We pointed out that these form a dynamic system involving feedback. 
   Based on this analytic model, we designed a simulation model using system dynamics. 
Assuming two patterns, namely high trust with low uncertainty and low trust with high 
uncertainty, we investigated how the stability of the strategic alliance, structural cooperation, and 
motivational cooperation behave over time. We found that stability with respect to a strategic 
alliance can be achieved through motivational cooperation in the case of high trust and low 
uncertainty. In the case of low trust and high uncertainty, we found that the strategic alliance 
became extremely unstable. Moreover, when a cooperative relationship is continued in this 
situation, despite the instability, the possibility exists that it will become stable due to the 
presence of motivational cooperation.
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   The contributions of this paper are as follows. First, we have presented an analytic 
framework relating to the maintenance of a strategic alliance, a topic that has previously not 
attracted much attention. We have also demonstrated, based on the results of our simulations 
using system dynamics, that motivational cooperation is an effective means of maintaining the 
stability of the strategicc alliance. 
   Finally, we should note the following three problems with and limitations of this research. 
First, the presented analytic model is, in the end, only a basic model, and more detailed variables 
should have been incorporated. For example, as trust formation factors, it would be useful in 
future research to consider partner reputation and the existence of past cooperative relationships. 
Second, our simulations using system dynamics have been based only on fictitious numerical 
values. A highly practical simulation model could, in the future, be designed after the 
relationships between variables had been determined, based on a survey and a multivariate 
analysis of its results. Third, we have not considered the issue of environment recognition. This 
paper has not incorporated the recognition patterns of companies themselves, which discriminate 
between environments, or the environmental uncertainty that exists within companies. With 
regard to the uncertainty of the external environment, it is conceivable that recognition patterns 
differ across companies. In the future, these points too will need to be addressed.
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